Articles Posted in Zoning and Land Use Law

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The New York Court of Appeals, in an action challenging the issuance of a use variance, clarified the application of the “relation back doctrine” to allow an amended petition adding a necessary party, after expiration of the statute of limitations. In Matter of Joseph Nemeth v. K-Tooling https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2023/2023_05349.htm the Court found, omitting the owner of the property at issue from the initial petition in the Article 78 challenge to the use variance could be cured through the relation back doctrine in CPLR 203 (C).

Outlining the general rule at issue, the Court explained that with: “the relation back doctrine, claims against a party mistakenly omitted from the initial filing and then added after the expiration of the limitations period may be treated as interposed when the action was timely commenced against the originally named respondents. The relation back doctrine applies when (1) the claims arise out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence; (2) the new party is ‘united in interest’ with an original defendant and thus can be charged with such notice of the commencement of the action such that a court concludes that the party will not be prejudiced in defending against the action; and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistaken omission, they would have been named in the initial pleading (see Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173, 178 [1995]).

The doctrine focuses on the notice and prejudice to the added party. However, the doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff ‘intentionally decides not to assert a claim against a party known to be potentially liable’ or when the new party was omitted ‘to obtain a tactical advantage in the litigation’ (id. at 181). These exceptions minimize gamesmanship and manipulation of the CPLR (see id.).'”

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In a decision that reiterated the need for there to be other than economic impacts to a property owner to serve as a basis for challenging the environmental review of a local law or ordinance, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court dismissal of a challenge to a zoning amendment. In the case, Matter of 1160 Mamaroneck Avenue Corp. v City of White Plains, the Appellate Division Second Department upheld the lower court decision dismissing the challenge to an amendment of the local zoning regulations and modified the lower court decision by affirmatively stating that the local law is valid.

Petitioner/Plaintiff (hereafter “Petitioner”) in this hybrid proceeding owns property in a residential district of the City of White Plains.  Petitioner maintains a non-conforming use on its property consisting of a nursery. As part of the nonconforming use, Petitioner processes various materials such as soil, wood chips and mulch.  The City undertook a review of those uses which included a proposed amendment to the City’s zoning regulations. The amendment was subject to review under the State Environmental Quality Review Act   (SEQRA) as a Type I action. After conducting an environmental review, the City issued a negative declaration. The City Council “upon determining that processing activities had various harmful effects that were incompatible within residential districts, adopted amendments to the City’s zoning ordinance (hereinafter the zoning amendments) which ban processing activities by nurseries located within a residential district.”

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The Appellate Division reversed a determination of the Supreme Court that had upheld the granting of a special permit and site plan, where the proposal failed to fully comply with the zoning ordinance. In the Matter of Marcus v. The Planning Board of the Village of Wesley Hills, the appellate division found that the lower court had erred in allowing the Planning Board to vary certain requirements for both the special permit and site plan.

The Respondent, Rockland Tree Expert, Inc., which does business in the Village as Ira Wickes, Arborist (hereinafter “Wickes”) had made an application, pursuant to the Village of Wesley Hills zoning ordinance, for a special permit to operate its nursery, landscaping and arborist business and for a site plan approval for the operation of the business within a primarily residential (R-35) zoning district.  As this was a business within a residential zone, the proposal needed review and approval of both a special permit, as well as for the site plan proposed by the applicant. The determinations  of the Planning Board were challenged and the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Planning Board.

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The Appellate Division Second Department found that challenges to requirements of two  Zoning Board of Appeals decisions and the conditions to a site plan approval issued by a Planning Board should stand. In the Matter of Florida Historical Society v. the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Florida, the Court held that the challenges to the two determinations by the Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) were not timely, as they failed to be commenced within thirty days of the filing of the determinations and further upheld the determination of the Planning Board, fixing  conditions with which the Petitioner failed to comply.

The Petitioner, Historical Society, was the beneficiary of the Estate of Raymond F. Green, who left his home and approximately fourteen surrounding acres of property to the Petitioner. The Petitioner sought to establish its headquarters, a meeting space and  museum at the location of the home and walking trails, with educational markers, on the remainder of the property.

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The Appellate Division Second Department recently ruled that, under the procedure followed by objecting neighbors, the local Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) lacked jurisdiction to rule on the neighbors’ objection. In  Matter of Capetola v. Town of Riverhead, the Petitioners/Plaintiffs (“Petitioners”), who owned a property nearby the property in contention, had raised an issue as to whether the proposed development required a lot area variance, but had failed to follow the proper procedure for raising such an objection.

The owner of the property seeking a building permit, Edward Hocker, received a denial from the Town Building Inspector, indicating that Hocker needed four area variances in order to obtain a building permit.   “At the public hearing concerning Hocker’s application, the petitioners…, who own a house close to the subject parcel, complained that, among other things, Hocker needed a lot size area variance to build on the subject parcel. After the hearing, the ZBA granted Hocker’s application for the four variances. The ZBA also determined that Hocker did not need a lot size area variance.”

Despite Petitioners’ objection at the hearing, claiming that a lot area variance was required, Petitioners had never directly appealed the determination of the building inspector, which determination did not include a finding of  the need for a lot area variance.

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The Appellate Division restated the requirement that all interested parties must be named in an action challenging a site plan approval and that a property owner and prospective developer are not necessarily united in interest. In Matter of Mensch v Planning Bd. of the Vil. of Warwick, the Court found that the failure of the Petitioner/Plaintiffs (“Petitioners”) to name the owners in the original Petition/Complaint was not cured by the filing of an amended pleading, subsequent to the passage of the thirty day statute of limitations.

The developer, 116 Elm Street Realty LLC (“the Developer”), sought permission to develop a parcel owned by Frank D. Petrucci, Lynn Crane, and Glenn Petrucci (“the Owners”). The Village Planning Board conducted a SEQRA review and issued a negative declaration. Thereafter, the Planning Board granted site plan approval to the Developer, permitting construction of a restaurant/catering facility on the property at issue. The Petitioners, who own property that borders the  site in question, then brought this hybrid Article 78/Declaratory Judgment Action, challenging the actions of the Planning Board, seeking a determination from the Building Inspector that the approval was for a use not permitted in the Zoning Code and a declaration that the use was not permitted. Initially, Petitioners failed to name the Owners  of the property. When Petitioners filed an amended Petition/Complaint, it was filed and served subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The lower court dismissed the case.

In upholding the lower court decision, the Appellate Division held:

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The Appellate Division determined that the failure to provide “dollars and cents” proof of the inability to use a property for any permitted use required denial of a use variance.  In Matter of Dean v. Town of Poland Zoning Board of Appeals, the owners of approximately 17 acres of land had agreed, subject to obtaining a use variance, to sell two acres of the property for construction of a retail store. Initially, the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) issued the use variance without making any findings. Upon challenge by the Petitioners, who own property nearby, the lower court upheld the issuance of the variance. On appeal, the Appellate Division remanded the matter for the ZBA to make proper findings and held the appeal pending the making of such findings. Thereafter, the ZBA made findings based upon the criteria set forth in Town Law section 267-b [2]. The Appellate Division then reversed the lower court and granted the petition to overturn the determination of the ZBA granting the use variance.

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The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court decision finding actions by the Village of Pomona in adopting four land use laws violated the rights of a proposed religious use. In Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. V. Village of Pomona, the Court summarized  the situation stating:

“This case poses difficult and in some respects subtle questions. Educational and religious institutions, as owners and users of real estate, are generally subject to local land use regulation. But they play unique roles in our society. Hence, our laws afford them some special treatment with respect to such regulation. Moreover, religious institutions enjoy the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and federal legislation, each of which, in appropriate circumstances, trumps local land use law.

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Last week the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied an action pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) challenging a local law that resulted in a religious school being denied the right to install specific lighting and a sound system for its baseball field. In Marianist Province of the United States; St. John Vianney High School, Inc.  v. City of Kirkwood, the Court held that the local regulations prohibiting spillage of light and sound, beyond certain levels,  into the adjacent neighborhood did not violate RLUIPA.

The high school, which provides religious teachings, has a sports program with a football stadium that contains lighting and a sound system. The baseball stadium did not contain lighting or a sound system.  The local public high school likewise has both football and baseball fields, with the football field having lighting and a sound system and the baseball field lacking both. In 2012 the City adopted local regulations that limited such systems so as to avoid disturbances cause by light spillage and loud sounds into adjacent neighborhoods.

“Vianney began the process of installing lights on its baseball field in late 2014. In 2015, contractors told the school that no lighting configuration could both comply with the lighting regulations and be bright enough to play baseball safely at night. Vianney therefore applied for a variance from the regulations. Kirkwood’s city planner told Vianney it did not need a variance, mistakenly thinking the baseball field already had lights. In October 2015, Vianney submitted a site plan for its improvements to the baseball field, which Kirkwood approved. Vianney then installed the lights at a cost in excess of $235,000. In January 2016, Vianney also installed an updated sound system on its baseball field.

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The Appellate Division upheld an area variance for zero lot frontage that permitted the merger of two lots for the purpose of constructing a single family house, where the merged lots are also non-conforming in other respects. In Matter of Nowak v. Town of Southampton. the applicant (Insource) sought to merge two preexisting nonconforming lots that together failed to meet the lot area requirements and lacked any road frontage, as required under the local zoning code. The access to the road would be solely over an existing easement.

After the Zoning Board of Appeals issued the frontage variance, the neighbor brought an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Zoning Board of Appeals’ determination. The lower court upheld the determination and the petitioner appealed to the Second Department.

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