The New York Court of Appeals held that the use of certain lands for park purposes under a memorandum of agreement or license/lease was not an implied permanent dedication for park purposes. In Matter of Glick v. Harvey the Court rejected the challenge to the City’s granting permission to utilize portions of certain playgrounds for other than park purposes, finding that there was no implied dedication of those spaces as parkland.
The Court noted that each of the spaces at issue was operated by the Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) pursuant to a reservation of ownership/control by other City departments.
“In support of their appeal, petitioners again advance their argument that the City’s actions manifest its intent to impliedly dedicate the parcels as parkland. Under the public trust doctrine, a land owner cannot alienate land that has been impliedly dedicated to a public use without obtaining the approval of the Legislature …. A party seeking to establish such an implied dedication and thereby successfully challenge the alienation of the land must show that: (1) ‘[t]he acts and declarations by the land owner indicating the intent to dedicate his land to the public use [are] unmistakable in their purpose and decisive in their character to have the effect of a dedication’ and (2) that the public has accepted the land as dedicated to a public use (Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge Co. v Bachman, 66 NY 261, 269 [1876]; see also Holdane v Trustees of Vil. of Cold Spring, 21 NY 474, 477 [1860][‘The owner’s acts and declarations should be deliberate, unequivocal and decisive, manifesting a positive and unmistakable intention to permanently abandon his property to the specific public use’]; Flack v Village of Green Island, 122 NY 107, 113 [1890]; Powell v City of New York, 85 AD3d 429, 431 [1st Dept 2011]).
It remains an open question whether the second prong of the implied dedication doctrine applies to a municipal land owner, but we need not and do not resolve that issue on this appeal because we conclude that the City’s acts are not an unequivocal manifestation of an intent to dedicate the parcels as permanent parkland. …”
The Court referencing the Appellate Division decision, noted:
“The permit, memorandum of understanding and lease/license relating to Mercer Playground, LaGuardia Park and LaGuardia Corners Gardens, respectively, show that ‘any management of the parcels by the [DPR] was understood to be temporary and provisional’ ….Thus, those documents’ restrictive terms show that, although the City permitted and encouraged some use of these three parcels for recreational and park-like purposes, it had no intention of permanently giving up control of the property.”