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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York finding that the Town of Greenburgh had violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in its handling of an application for land use approvals by a church. In Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner (10-3634-cv), the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court which had ” ordered broad relief: (1) it annulled the positive declaration and findings statement; (2) it ordered that the Church’s 2000 site plan be deemed approved for SEQRA purposes and enjoined any further SEQRA review; (3) it ordered the Board to grant the Church a waiver from the landscaped parking island requirement; (4) it ordered the Zoning Board to grant a variance permitting a side building location; (5) it ordered the Town to issue a building permit for the 2000 site plan; (6) it enjoined the Town from taking any action that unreasonably interferes with the Church’s project; and (7) it imposed $10,000 in sanctions for spoliation of evidence.”

For a detailed discussion of the facts and the District Court’s findings see our August 2010 Blog post on that decision.

In its appeal, the Town raised several arguments: “(1) RLUIPA is by its terms inapplicable to the environmental quality review process employed by the Town to reject the proposal, (2) there was insufficient evidence that the defendants had imposed a substantial burden on plaintiffs’ religious exercise under RLUIPA, (3) plaintiffs’ class-of-one Equal Protection claim is not viable because they have not alleged a single comparator similarly situated in all respects, (4) plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights were not violated, (5) the Town did not violate Article 78, and (6) the district court lacked the authority to order the Town Zoning Board, a non-party, to take any action with regard to the Church.”

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The Appellate Division dismissed a challenge to a special permit, when the petitioner delayed bringing an Article 78 proceeding while the recipient of the special permit continued with construction. in Matter of Miner v. Town of Duanesburg Planning Board, The Court held:

“Petitioners were present and spoke at the March 2011 Planning Board meeting at which Long Energy’s application was considered and the special use permit was granted. Nonetheless, petitioners did not commence this proceeding until June 2011, by which time Long Energy had already expended over $200,000 and construction of the facility was very near completion. Additionally, inasmuch as petitioners’ negotiations with Long Energy centered around their viewshed concerns, respondents were not on notice that petitioners would commence this proceeding challenging the use of the property. Thus, although petitioners’ effort to resolve their concerns through negotiations directly with Long Energy is commendable, their failure to pursue any legal remedy while construction of the facility proceeded to near completion right before [*3]their eyes must result in dismissal of this proceeding (see Matter of Clarke v Town of Sand Lake Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 52 AD3d 997, 999-1000 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 707 [2008]; Marlowe v Elmwood, Inc., 34 AD3d 970, 971-973 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 804 [2007]).”

Steven Silverberg

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The Appellate Division reversed a lower court holding that neighbors of the controversial Patrick Farm development in the Town of Ramapo lacked standing to challenge the approval of changes to the Town’s comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. In Matter of Shapiro v. Town of Ramapo, the Appellate Division Upheld dismissal of the challenge to the Town’s transfer of the site to a developer but reinstated the causes of action challenging the zoning amendments and the SEQRA review.

Holding the claim that the Town illegally transferred park land to the developer is time barred the Court noted the action was commenced in 2010 to challenge the 2001 transfer of the property, well outside the six year statute of limitations. However, the Court found the lower court erred when it held that the Petitioners, who live “across the street” from the proposed development, lacked standing.

The Court stated:

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The Appellate Division restated the rule that when challenging a land use approval the challenger must seek a preliminary injunction in order to maintain the status quo. In Matter of Papert v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Quogue, the Court upheld dismissal of the petition challenging the zoning board’s issuance of a coastal zone erosion permit to reconstruct an existing house as academic. The motion to dismiss was made claiming substantial completion of the project and the lower court granted the motion after construction was completed and a certificate of occupancy was issued.

Holding that “the petitioner failed to move in the Supreme Court for a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this litigation, he did not timely do all he could have done to safeguard his interests, and thus, he failed to preserve his rights pending judicial review,” the Court noted that as a result the property owner “would suffer substantial prejudice if the petitioner prevailed….”

However, the Court also indicated that this rule is not without exception when, in upholding the dismissal, it also found that the property owner “did not proceed with the construction in bad faith or without authority” and further, “this proceeding did not present ‘novel issues or public interests such as environmental concerns’ that warranted retention of jurisdiction (Matter of Dreikausen v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 98 NY2d at 173).”

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A Court found that the rezoning of a single parcel, although different from the designation in the comprehensive plan, was still consistent with that plan. However, the Court held the town board did not fully comply with SEQRA. In Matter of Bergami v. Town Board of the Town of Roterdam, the Appellate Division reversed the lower court finding that the Town Board, as lead agency, had failed to take the requisite “hard look” under SEQRA.

The Town Board had previously adopted and then amended a comprehensive plan that ultimately called for rezoning the area of the town including the subject property to a professional office zone. Yet, the Town Board never adopted those modifications to the local zoning law. In 2009 the property owner applied for a rezoning to the business district. Ultimately, the town board issued a SEQRA negative declaration and amended the zoning of the parcel to business.

Neighboring property owners challenged the action as spot zoning. However the Court found the action was not spot zoning noting:

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The Appellate Division found that a zoning amendment adopted “primarily” to assist one property owner is not spot zoning. In the Matter of Marcus v. Bd. of Trustees of the Village of Wesley Hills, the Court found that while ” there is no doubt that the Local Law was adopted primarily for the benefit of the plant nursery and arborist business operated by Ira Wickes and Rockland Tree Expert, Inc., doing business as Ira Wickes Arborist (hereinafter together Wickes), zoning changes are not invalid merely because a single parcel is involved in or benefitted by said changes (see Rodgers v Village of Tarrytown, 302 NY at 124).”

In upholding the local law the Court found that the use was compatible with other uses in the area and the Village’s comprehensive plan. Significantly, the Court noted that two other properties in the Village could meet the requirements under the challenged amendment. Further the, Court held: “there is no evidence in the record that Wickes’s use of the property in compliance with the Local Law and a special permit issued thereunder would be detrimental to owners of other properties in the area…”

In addressing SEQRA issues, the Court found that the issuance of a negative declaration was In conformity with the regulations and also noted, “the Board’s deferral of site-specific review of certain environmental issues to the Village’s Planning Board, upon its consideration of individual special permit applications, was no less protective of the environment (see 6 NYCRR 617.3[g][1]).”

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The New York Court of Appeals upheld the determination by the New York City Department of City Planning to issue a negative declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) for a rezoning of a portion of Brooklyn. In Matter of Chinese Staff and Workers Association v. Burden, the Court found that the issuance of the negative declaration by the Department of Planning did not abuse it’s discretion.

The Court noted:

“:An agency’s “initial determination under . . . SEQRA and CEQR is whether an EIS [environmental impact statement] is required, which in turn depends on whether an action may or will not have a significant effect on the environment” (Chinese Staff & Workers Assn. v City of New York, 68 NY2d 359, 364 [1986]). “In making its initial determination, the agency will study many of the same concerns that must be assessed in an EIS, including both long- and short-term environmental effects” (Farrell, 100 NY2d at 190). Where an agency determines that an EIS is not required, it will issue a “negative declaration” (id.). “Although the threshold triggering an EIS is relatively low, a negative declaration is properly issued when the agency has made a thorough investigation of the problems involved and reasonably exercised its discretion” (id. [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]).”

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The Second Ciircuit Court of Appeals found that a town’s practice of conducting prayers at the begining of town board meetings, as a result of the totality of the manner in which the prayer leaders were selected and the prayers were conducted, violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. In

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The dismissal of a challenge, by an adjoining Village, to a Town’s rezoning of a parcel in the Town was modified by allowing challenges to the SEQRA determination and the claim of a lack of compliance with General Municipal Law § 239-m to proceed. In Village of Pomona v. Town of Ramapo, the Appellate Divisions upheld the dismissal of of a cause of action claiming failure to comply with General Municipal Law §239-nn, which requires notice to abutting municipalities, holding that the statute does not create a separate right of action. The Court also upheld dismissal of the claim that the zoning enactment failed to comply with the Town’s comprehensive plan noting:

“we held in Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo (45 AD3d 74), villages ‘have no interest in [a] Town Board’s compliance with . . . its comprehensive plan,’ since, unlike individuals who reside within the Town, ‘[villages] are beyond the bounds of the mutuality of restriction and benefit that underlies the comprehensive plan requirement….'”

However, the Court found that, contrary to the arguments made by the Defendants, the Village did have standing to bring other challenges to the Town’s actions:

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The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the granting of a use variance and related area variances to permit expansion of a non-confirming adult entertainment night club. In Matter of Edwards v. Davison, the Mount Vernon City Council, in light of legislation adopted several years ago to ban such uses from the City’s downtown business district, took the unusual step of suing the Zoning Board of Appeals to challenge the approval of the variances, which allowed the expansion of the non-conforming club.

The Appellate Division held:

“As the record was devoid of any evidence, in dollars and cents form, of Veronica Realty’s inability to realize a reasonable return under the existing permissible uses, there was no rational basis for the ZBA’s finding that the premises would not yield a reasonable return in the absence of the requested use variance….”

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