New York Zoning and Municipal Law BlogThe determination by the local building inspector that a 1928 “subdivision” did not create two lots was upheld by the Appellate Division. In Steven Silverberg
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Property Owner Found To Be Within Zone Of Interest For Standing To Challenge Development
An appellate court reversed a lower court decision dismissing, for lack of standing, a challenge brought by a nearby property owner to a development over 1,000 feet from his property. In Matter of Ontario Heights Homeowners Association v. Town of Oswego Planning Board, the Appellate Division Fourth Department held that the property owner was within the “zone of interest” under the Environmental Conservation Law and therefore had standing to raise a challenge to a proposed development on environmental grounds.
The lower court had dismissed the action by the property owner across the street whose property is 697 feet from the property line of the development and 1,242 feet from the actual development. However, the Appellate Division held:
“Supreme Court erred in determining that he lacks standing to bring this proceeding. Dunsmoor, who resides across the street from the proposed development, has alleged that he may suffer environmental harm as a result of the Planning Board’s decision to permit the developer to utilize a private sewage treatment plant on the proposed development, rather than utilizing the City of Oswego’s public sewer system…. he is ” arguably within the zone of interest to be protected by [article 8 of the Environmental Conservation Law]’ . . . and [has] standing to seek judicial review without pleading and proving special damage, because adverse effect or aggrievement can be inferred from the proximity’ ”
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Court Holds Documents Exchanged Between Federal and State Agencies May Be Exempt From FOIL, But Settlement Documents Exchanged WIth Corporation Are Not
A court held that documents exchanged between the EPA and the New York DEC may be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) as inter-agency communications, but additional documents exchanged as part of the settlement negotiations with General Electric are subject to disclosure. In Town of Waterford v. New York Department of Environmental Conservation, the lower court held that the exemption from disclosure of inter-agency communications, contained in Public Officers Law section 87 (2)(g), does not apply to communications between state and federal agencies, but that documents prepared for settlement purposes were not subject to disclosure. The Appellate Division disagreed on both points.
With respect to the issue of inter-agency exemption applying to communications between state and federal agencies, the Court held, while generally the law favors disclosure of documents, the claim that “this exemption can never be applied to a communication with a federal agency, no matter its content or context – is dramatically at odds with the very purpose for which this exemption was enacted and one that, on these facts, is not in the public interest.’
The Court reviewed the history of the underlying project at issue, which is to clean up PCBs in the Hudson River resulting from industrial activities. The Court noted the EPA, Department of Health (DOH) and DEC all have statutory authority to address the issues and had worked cooperatively toward a resolution since 1984. Thus, the Court concluded:
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Court Rules on Use of Municipal Funds and Labor for Religious Display
The Appellate Division concluded that the context in which a menorah was displayed was not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion but that the nightly lighting of the menorah by municipal employees, even if the cost is reimbursed, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In Chabad of Mid-Hudson Valley v. City of Poughkeepsie, the Court found that a downtown display in the City’s business district, which included lights, wreaths and a Christmas tree, even though these are not considered religious symbols, created a context for the nearby display of a menorah as a “celebration of the diversity of the holiday season.”
However the Court concluded that:
“allowing the plaintiffs to use municipal funds, labor, and equipment for the nightly menorah lighting, even if the plaintiffs repaid the City for such labor and equipment, as required under the stipulation, would foster the perception of an unconstitutional excessive governmental entanglement with religion (see Walz v Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 US 664, 674; Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v City & County of Denver, 481 F Supp 522, 530, cert denied 452 US 963; cf. American Civil Liberties Union v City of Birmingham, 791 F2d 1561, 1656-1566, cert denied 479 US 939; Ritell v Village of Briarcliff Manor, 466 F Supp 2d at 526; see also County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 US at 616 [“[t]he Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a religious symbol”]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the intervenors’ motion which was for summary judgment declaring that the use of municipal funds, labor, and equipment to display the plaintiffs’ menorah violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the extent of prohibiting the use of municipal funds, labor, and equipment to assist in the nightly lighting of the menorah.”
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N.Y. DEC Issues Updated SEQRA Handbook
The New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) has issued a new SEQRA Handbook. The Handbook was first issued in 1982 and then updated in 1992. The SEQRA regulations were revised in 1996, but no update of the Handbook followed. Now it has finally been updated. Its purpose is described by the DEC as follows:
“The SEQR Handbook provides agencies, project sponsors, and the public with a practical reference guide to the procedures prescribed by the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQR)–Article 8 of the Environmental Conservation Law. It addresses common questions that arise during the process of applying SEQR. The Handbook also attempts to address the needs of individuals who have varying degrees of experience with SEQR. Topics range from an introduction to the basic SEQR process to discussions of important procedural and substantive details.”
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Court Finds Westchester Town Violated RLUIPA and Overturns SEQRA Findings
In a 206 page decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found the Town of Greenburgh had violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) when it refused to grant a church permission to build a new building, for what the court termed “contrived” reasons. In Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, the Court found, contrary to the claim of the Town, that the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) constitutes an individualized assessment of a land use application, that the review falls within the RLUIPA definition of land use regulation as the application of SEQRA “can limit or restrict a claimant’s use or development of land” and that the actions of the Town in issuing findings pursuant to SEQRA, which limited the use of the Church’s property, constitute a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under RLUIPA.
The Court was no doubt brought to this conclusion in large part by its finding that the “majority” of the Town’s witnesses were lacking in credibility. The Court went so far as to find “not only the admitted destruction of probative evidence, but the existence of evidence relevant to the issues before this Court that Defendants never produced to Plaintiffs. Outrageously, Defendants attempted to enter such previously undisclosed documents into evidence during trial.” The Court therefore held “that the conduct of Defendants warrants both an adverse inference based on spoliation of evidence and sanctions.”
The Court reviewed the history of RLUIPA and its purpose to “protect against inter alia ‘subtle forms of discrimination.'” It then went on to note that under RLUIPA, once a plaintiff demonstrates that conduct in implementing a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden upon religious exercise, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the burden imposed is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” The Court found that the activities at issue fall within the jurisdiction of RLUIPA noting that a number of courts have held that construction of a church implicates interstate commerce. It further found that since the activities of the church will support missionary efforts that too implicate interstate and international commerce.
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Court Upholds SEQRA Determination and Subdivision for 850,000 Square Foot Shopping Center
The Appellate Division upheld two lower court decisions which dismissed challenges to the SEQRA findings, site plan and subdivision approval for a shopping center in the Town of Newburgh. In Matter of Save Open Space v. Planning Bd. Of the Town of Newburgh the court noted judicial review is limited to finding whether an action is arbitrary, an error of law or was taken in violation of lawful procedure.
In this case there was an application for site plan approval for a shopping center. The planning board completed a full environmental review, which included a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), public hearings and a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) as well an Environmental Findings Statement (EFS). However, after the FEIS was submitted, but before the EFS was issued, the applicant submitted an application to subdivide the property into four lots to allow for separate ownership. The application was rejected as incomplete and thereafter the planning board did issue its EFS.
The applicant subsequently resubmitted its subdivision application. Shortly thereafter the planning board granted site plan but not subdivision approval. The next step taken by the planning board was to issue an amended EFS in which it found that the subdivision would not have any significant adverse environmental impacts. After holding a public hearing on the subdivision the planning board granted preliminary and final subdivision approval.
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New York Legislature Amends Opening Meetings Law Requirements
The New York Legislature has adopted several amendments to portions of New York’s Open Meetings Law (sections 103 and 107 of the Public Officers Law) in order to provide for more transparency in the conduct of governmental activities, as set forth in three recently adopted chapters.
Chapter 40 took effect in April, 2010. This Chapter adds a new subsection (d) to section 103 of the Public Officers Law which states in pertinent part:
“Public bodies shall make or cause to be made all reasonable efforts to ensure that meetings are held in an appropriate facility which adequately accommodates members of the public who wish to attend such meetings.”
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N.Y. Court of Appeals Reverses Appellate Division and Says Columbia University Condemnation May Proceed
In a rebuke to the Appellate Division First Department, the New York Court of Appeals today held that the condemnation of land on the upper west side of Manhattan to benefit Columbia University may go forward. In Matter of Kaur v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division rejection of the proposed condemnation and, in reliance on its recent holding in Matter of Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corporation, held that the findings of (1) blight, (2) that the petitioner’s property qualified as a “land use improvement project” and (3) the finding of a “civic purpose” to the project, were “rationally based and entitled to deference.”
The proposal is for development of a new 17 acre campus for Columbia University. Over the last decade Columbia has acquire a majority of the parcels in the area, however, a number of property owners have held out and this challenge is to the proposal by the Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) to utilize its authority under the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) to acquire the balance of the parcels within the area covered by ESDC’s General Project Plan (GPP) to implement the Columbia proposal. After reviewing the history of the case, the Court reviewed and struck down each of the holdings of the Appellate Division.
The Court noted that the main argument in opposition was that the condemnation is not for the purpose of putting the properties to a “public use” within the meaning of the New York Constitution and that the findings of blight were arrived at in bad faith. The Court noted that in “Matter of Goldstein, we reaffirmed the longstanding doctrine that the role of the Judiciary is limited in reviewing findings of blight in eminent domain proceedings…Thus, given our precedent, the de novo review of the record undertaken by the plurality of the Appellate Division was improper. On the “record upon which the ESDC determination was based and by which we are bound” (id. at 517, citing Matter of Levine v New York State Liq. Auth., 23 NY2d 863, 864 [1969]), it cannot be said that ESDC’s finding of blight was irrational or baseless. Indeed, ESDC considered a wide range of factors including the physical, economic, engineering and environmental conditions at the Project site. Its decision was not based on any one of these factors, but on the Project site conditions as a whole. Accordingly, since there is record support – “extensively documented photographically and otherwise on a lot-by-lot basis” (id. at 526) – for ESDC’s determination that the Project site was blighted, the Appellate Division plurality erred when it substituted its view for that of the legislatively designated agency.”
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Another Vested Rights Decision From The N.Y. Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled today that owners of a landfill had a vested right to use all 50 acres of their property as a landfill, even though they had only used 3 acres before more restrictive zoning was implemented. In Matter of Jones v Town of Carroll the court found that landfill operations were similar to mining operations and therefore the Court’s recent holding in Glacial Aggregates LLC v. Town of Yorkshire, in which the Court concluded that for mining operations the expense of the permitting process, coupled with taking forty truck loads of material for testing, removal of timber and surveying a road and mining areas was sufficient to establish a vested right to the use and manifest an intent to mine the area, was applicable to this case and warranted a finding of vested rights (see our 2/18/10 Blog on the Glacial Aggregates case).
Originally the Plaintiffs had received a variance to operate a landfill from the Town as long as they obtained permits from the DEC to operate the landfill. Plaintiffs later received a permit from the DEC to operate a landfill on only 3 of the 50 acres. In 2005 the Town changed the zoning and prohibited the expansion of any landfill. Plaintiffs challenged the law and won in the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed finding that, since a condition of the variance was obtaining DEC permits and the permit was limited to 3 acres, there was no vested right to use the remaining 47 acres as a landfill, as such use was merely contemplated.
The Court of Appeals reversed finding that the owner had a vested right to use the entire 50 acres as a landfill. The Court held: “the use of property as a landfill, like a mine, is unique because it necessarily envisions that the land itself is a resource that will be consumed over time. Additionally, the owner of landfill property can reasonably be expected to hold a portion of the land in reserve for future expansion of that activity, just as a quarry operator may find necessary. The fact that the DEC permit covered only a limited area is not determinative of plaintiffs’ rights over the remaining 47 acres of the parcel (see Buffalo Crushed Stone, 13 NY3d at 101-102). Instead, the factors to examine are whether the operation of a C & D landfill was a lawful use on the property prior to the enactment of the 2005 zoning law and whether plaintiffs’ activities before that time manifested an intent to utilize all of their property in a manner consistent with that purpose.”