Published on:

The New York Court of Appeals held that the Freedom of Information Law carries the presumption of access to records. In reversing the holding of the Appellate Division and remitting the matter for a factual determination, the Court held in Matter of Data Tree, LLC v. Romaine that the Suffolk County Clerk, which claimed the requested documents were exempt from disclosure, “carries the burden of demonstrating that the exemption applies to the FOIL request.”

Data Tree is in the business of providing property records electronically and had requested that the County Clerk supply copies of various public land records from 1983 to the present, in an electronic format. When the Clerk failed to respond within five days, Data Tree treated this as a de facto denial and made an administrative appeal. The County Attorney denied the appeal citing three grounds (1) the request would require rewriting data which the Clerk is not required to do, (2) there would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy due to the volume and commercial nature of the request and (3) the records are otherwise available for copying individually in the Clerk’s Office. The determination was upheld by the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division.

The Court held that unless a specific exemption applies the records must be made available. After noting that the exemptions must be “narrowly interpreted” the Court agreed that the Appellate Division had engaged in improper burden shifting. It found that the burden is on the Clerk to prove an exemption applies not upon the applicant to prove an exemption does not apply.

Published on:

Finding that a zoning board had “improperly succumbed to community pressure,” the Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the lower court’s reversal of the denial of an area variance. In the case of Schumacher v. Town of East Hampton Zoning Board of Appeals, the Court noted the limited nature of judicial review of zoning board decisions but found that the zoning board’s actions were arbitrary.

In reversing the zoning board, the Court found that the proposed reconstruction of the applicant’s home would actually be an increase of the existing setback from the wetlands at issue and that all of the lots surrounding the property were “nonconforming in terms of the applicable requirements for setbacks from wetlands.” The court concluded that the zoning board’s determination that the house should be decreased in size was “irrational.”

Published on:

Our partner, Steven Silverberg was quoted extensively today in a Westchester Business Journal Article concerning the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) which can be read at http://www.westchestercountybusiness.com/archive/121707/1217070004.php4. Citing the large number of cases that have been brought against municipalities the article notes: “I think it’s gotten out of balance at this point,” Silverberg said. “There should be a way to provide balance, to protect religious groups but not give them a bludgeon to beat municipalities into submission.”

Published on:

The Appellate Division Fourth Department reversed the granting of a site plan approval where it found that three planning board members had “impermissibly prejudged” an application. In Schweichler v. Village of Caledonia the court dismissed claims of improper spot zoning and violations of SEQRA but remitted the site plan application for further review by the planning board stating “the appearance of bias and actual bias in this case require annulment of the Planning Board’s site plan approval.”

The court noted that three members of the planning board had signed a petition in favor of rezoning the property. Further, the chair had “manifested actual bias” when she wrote to the Mayor supporting the rezoning. Her letter went so far as to state that she would like to see the new housing made available to her so she could sell her home. To further seal the fate of the application, the court found that there were no measurements provided to demonstrate compliance with the Village Code.

How to hold further hearings on an application where the court found three of the members were biased? The court noted that Village Law section 7-718 (16)(b) permits designation by the chair of alternate members and directed that an acting chair perform the duties of the chair pursuant to Village Law section 7-718 (10).

Published on:

The New York Court of Appeals held today in Haberman v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Long Beach that the attorney representing the zoning board may extend the time to commence construction under the terms of a variance without action by the zoning board. The Court held, absent proof that the attorney had acted in violation of instructions from the zoning board there is no statutory prohibition against the attorney extending the time to begin building.

While action by a zoning board is required to grant a variance, the Court found there was no statutory requirement for a new hearing to extend the time to commence construction permitted by the variance. Therefore, where the variance required that construction commence within a specified time period, the attorney representing the board could grant an extension of time.

Published on:

In a case of first impression, the New York Court of Appeals ruled today that an open space restriction which appears solely on a subdivision map but is not otherwise recorded in land records is binding upon subsequent purchasers of the property. In O’Mara v. Town of Wappinger the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: “Is an open space restriction imposed by a subdivision plat under New York Law §276 enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, and under what circumstances?”

The New York Court of Appeals held that such an open space restriction “when filed in the Office of the County Clerk pursuant to Real Property Law §334, is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser.” The property in question had been subdivided in 1963 and the plat had a notation indicating there was an open space restriction. It was then purchased by the Plaintiffs in 2000 at a tax sale. At the time of acquiring title, a title insurance policy was issued which did not disclose the open space restriction, which was only on the plat and not part of a separately recorded instrument. A survey was performed after purchase in order to obtain approvals for construction. Although the surveyor apparently observed the open space notation on the original subdivision plat he did not note it on the survey. Permits were issued and construction nearly completed on a house when the new building inspector discovered the open space notation and stopped work.

The Plaintiffs unsuccessfully brought a number of claims in federal court which resulted in certification of the question to the Court of Appeals. Their position was that the reservation of open space to the benefit of the Town was effectively a conveyance of an interest in real property which required recording in the County Clerk’s Office under Real Property Law §291, in the same manner as a deed. Plaintiffs argued that absent such a recording they were not, as subsequent purchasers, placed on notice and should not be bound by the restriction.

Published on:

In a significant decision regarding the application and interpretation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) the Second Circuit Court of Appeals today affirmed the Southern District (Connor, J.) in finding that the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Mamaroneck violated RLUIPA by denying a special permit to the Westchester Day School (see our March 6, 2006 Blog on the earlier decision).

The School is a Jewish day school which has been in existence for 60 years and applied for a modification of its special permit in order to construct a new classroom building. In upholding the District Court the Second Circuit, which had avoided ruling on the constitutionality of RLUIPA previously, held that the statute is constitutional.

In response to the argument that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause the Court held: “RLUIPA cannot be said to advance religion simply by requiring that states not discriminate against or among religious institutions.” The Court further found that RLUIPA was properly applied under the authority of the Commerce Clause as the 44,000 square foot nine million dollar building proposed to be constructed by the School implicated interstate commerce. The Court noted that even if the impact upon interstate commerce is minimal it is sufficient to meet that jurisdictional element.

Published on:

The appellate division dismissed a challenge to a town board resolution authorizing consideration of a cluster development in the case of Maor v. Town of Ramapo Planning Board, finding it was not a “final determination” subject to review.

Toll Brothers had applied to the planning board for a subdivision and submitted a conventional subdivision plat of 51 lots. The Planning Board referred the application to the Town Board to consider authorizing the Planning Board to treat the application as a cluster development, with a maximum permitted lot count of 51 lots, under Town Law section 278. The Town Board held a public hearing and adopted a resolution authorizing the Planning Board to consider a maximum 51 lot cluster development.

The petitioners brought a challenge claiming the resolution was contrary to law and had not been subject to review under the Environmental Conservation Law (SEQRA). The Court held the “determinations were preliminary steps in the approval process for a ‘cluster development’ subdivision and, as such, were not final determinations subject to judicial review….” Therefore, contrary to the claims of the petitioners, no SEQRA review would be necessary prior to the initial step of merely permitting consideration of a subdivision as a cluster development.

Published on:

The failure to analyze the environmental impacts of a sewerage diversion plan formed the basis for the Appellate Division Second Department voiding a zoning amendment in Matter of ACI Shore Rd., LLC v. Incorporated Village of Great Neck. The Village of Great Neck had proposed a zoning amendment to implement a residential Waterfront Development District in an area which had previously been an industrial zone. At the same time the Village was considering decommissioning two sewerage treatment plants in the area and diverting the sewerage to a plant 16 miles away.

The Court found that the DGEIS for the new zone included a conceptual site plan replacing the sewerage treatment plants with a mixed use development and waterfront park. Yet, except for noting generally that it was anticipated the diversion of sewerage would have beneficial impacts, the Court noted “despite the apparent interrelatedness of the redevelopment plan and sewerage diversion plan, neither the DGEIS nor the FGEIS contained any analysis of potential environmental impacts of the sewerage diversion plan.”

Therefore the Court found that the environmental review had been improperly segmented as the potential impacts of the sewerage diversion plan should have been considered and noted the “record belies” the claim by the Village that “the sewerage diversion plan was speculative, hypothetical, or not part of a larger unified plan.” Finally, the Court held that the Village failed to take a “hard look” at other potential impacts. Rather than analyzing impacts of proposed dredging and soil remediation, which were part of the overall project, the DGEIS, FGEIS and SEQRA findings statement contained no analysis of these issues.

Published on:

In a comprehensive review of the capacity and standing of one municipality to sue another over local zoning, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Town of Ramapo, held that villages have the capacity to sue a town over a local law enacting a zoning amendment. Yet the Court also found their standing is limited to SEQRA and General Municipal Law compliance rather than the local law’s consistency with a comprehensive plan.

The Town had adopted a zoning amendment by local law which permitted adult student housing. The law applied to four parcels of land near or adjacent to the boundary of four Villages located in the Town. The four villages and two individuals commenced a combined Article 78/declaratory judgment action challenging the local law, and subsequent actions which incorporated the local law. The lower court dismissed the action on a cross motion by the Town finding lack of capacity to sue and/or lack of standing on each of the causes of action. The Appellate Division modified.

First, the Court noted that Village Law specifically authorizes Villages to sue and be sued. The Town had argued that Town Law Section 264 provides that a village may not challenge a Town’s zoning in court. The Court distinguished a zoning amendment adopted pursuant to Town Law from a case such as this with a local law enacting a zoning regulation under Municipal Home Rule Law. The court found that Municipal Home Rule Law did not similarly restrict a challenge by a village.

Contact Information