New York Zoning and Municipal Law Blog

The dismissal of a challenge, by an adjoining Village, to a Town's rezoning of a parcel in the Town was modified by allowing challenges to the SEQRA determination and the claim of a lack of compliance with General Municipal Law § 239-m to proceed. In Village of Pomona v. Town of Ramapo, the Appellate Divisions upheld the dismissal of of a cause of action claiming failure to comply with General Municipal Law §239-nn, which requires notice to abutting municipalities, holding that the statute does not create a separate right of action. The Court also upheld dismissal of the claim that the zoning enactment failed to comply with the Town's comprehensive plan noting:

"we held in Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo (45 AD3d 74), villages 'have no interest in [a] Town Board's compliance with . . . its comprehensive plan,' since, unlike individuals who reside within the Town, '[villages] are beyond the bounds of the mutuality of restriction and benefit that underlies the comprehensive plan requirement....'"

However, the Court found that, contrary to the arguments made by the Defendants, the Village did have standing to bring other challenges to the Town's actions:

"'[T]he right of a municipality to challenge the acts of its neighbors must be determined on the basis of the same rules of standing that apply to litigants generally... Community character is specifically protected by SEQRA '... 'The power to define the community character is a unique prerogative of a municipality acting in its governmental capacity . . . 'Substantial development in an adjoining municipality can have a significant detrimental impact on the character of a community . . . thereby limiting the ability of the affected municipality to determine its community character'" (citations omitted).

In further holding that the Village had a right to contest the SEQRA determination leading up to the challenged actions, the court held:

"'The unique nature of a municipality's environmental interests . . . requires that the inquiry into its environmental standing not be a mechanical one, particularly in light of the established preference that the issues presented by land use disputes be decided on the merits . . . rather than by a heavy-handed approach to standing'...the Village did not have to show, in opposition to the motions, that the proposed development 'would be visible from any particular Pomona neighborhoods' or that 'the plans call for clear-cutting and/or a lack of plantings or other visual barriers,' and the Village did not have to explain in further detail how the significant increase in density would specifically affect the character of the community...."

Finally, on the issue of bringing a challenge under General Municipal Law 239-m the Court found:

"the Village has standing to assert the fourth cause of action. The purpose of General Municipal Law § 239-m, which governs the review process by a county planning agency of a municipality's proposed planning and zoning actions, is to 'bring pertinent inter-community and county-wide planning, zoning, site plan and subdivision considerations to the attention of neighboring municipalities and agencies having jurisdiction' (General Municipal Law § 239-l[2]) and by so doing to facilitate regional review of land use proposals that may be of regional concern' (Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo, 45 AD3d at 88-89). 'Because [an] adjoining municipalit[y] necessarily [has] the same interest [as individual neighbors] in the regional review that General Municipal Law § 239-m requires, the Village[ ] also [has] standing to assert such claims'."

- Steven Silverberg

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the granting of a use variance and related area variances to permit expansion of a non-confirming adult entertainment night club. In Matter of Edwards v. Davison, the Mount Vernon City Council, in light of legislation adopted several years ago to ban such uses from the City's downtown business district, took the unusual step of suing the Zoning Board of Appeals to challenge the approval of the variances, which allowed the expansion of the non-conforming club.

The Appellate Division held:

"As the record was devoid of any evidence, in dollars and cents form, of Veronica Realty's inability to realize a reasonable return under the existing permissible uses, there was no rational basis for the ZBA's finding that the premises would not yield a reasonable return in the absence of the requested use variance...."

The other unusual aspect of the case, which was raised on appeal, but not reached by the Court, is that with respect to certain of the criteria to be examined by a ZBA in issuing use and area variances, the Zoning Board of Appeals' findings merely noted it did "not opine" on those issues. Silverberg Zalantis, which represented the City Council, was hopeful of getting a ruling on that issue as well, but the Court apparently felt it was no necessary to reach that issue.

-Steven Silverberg

The New York Court of Appeals issued a decision today finding that the inter-agency/intra-agency exemption under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) does not apply to Federal Agency communications with State Agencies. The case of Matter of Town of Waterford v New York State DEC, was extensively discussed in a post on this Blog when the Appellate Division (77 A.D.3d 224 (3rd Dept. 2010)) held that such communications could be exempt. Today's decision reverses that holding.

The Court noted that while there is an exemption for "pre-decisional inter-agency or intra-agency materials" (Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g)) the term agency has a specific definition and under FOIL

"'[a]gency' means any state or municipal department, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority, public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities thereof, except the judiciary or the state legislature' (Public Officers Law § 86 [3])"

The Court thus concluded that the EPA, as a Federal Agency, is not included within the definition of agency for purposes of FOIL and therefore does not fall within the exemption. In addressing the Town's arguments that there have been cases where the intra-agency exemption has been applied to outside parties, the Court drew a clear distinction:

"We have held that the purpose of the intra-agency exception is to allow individuals within an agency to exchange their views freely, as part of the deliberative process, without the concern that those ideas will become public (see Matter of New York Times Co. v City of N.Y. Fire Dept., 4 NY3d 477, 488 [2005]; Matter of Xerox Corp. v Town of Webster (65 NY2d 131, 132 [1985]). In Xerox, we determined that real estate appraisal reports prepared by a private consulting firm at the agency's request were exempt from disclosure as intra-agency material (see 65 NY2d at 133). We observed that '[i]t would make little sense to protect the deliberative process when such reports are prepared by agency employees yet deny this protection when reports are prepared for the same purpose by outside consultants retained by agencies' (Xerox, 65 NY2d at 133)."

While the court noted that the DEC and EPA were working in a collaborative manner on the particular matter at issue, this was not the same as an outside consultant, as the EPA was not retained by the DEC and was not an employee or agent of DEC.

-Steven M. Silverberg

While upholding the denial of some area variances and a special permit, finding the evidence in the record supported that determination, the Appellate Division also reversed the denial of a special permit for a refuse enclosure, as well as a variance for placement of a sign. In Matter of White Castle Sys., Inc. v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, the Court noted:

"'Unlike a variance which gives permission to an owner to use property in a manner inconsistent with a local zoning ordinance, a special exception gives permission to use property in a way that is consistent with the zoning ordinance, although not necessarily allowed as of right'.... Thus, the burden of proof on an owner seeking a special exception is lighter than that on an owner seeking a variance. The owner is required only to show compliance with legislatively imposed conditions pertaining to the intended use.... 'Failure to comply with any condition upon a special exception, however, is sufficient ground for denial of the exception'."(citations omitted)

Here the Court found that the denial of the special permit was not supported by the record and the matter was remanded for the zoning board to grant the special permit with appropriate conditions.

-Steven M. Silverberg

The Appellate Division held that where an EAF identified either neutral or beneficial effects from a proposed zoning amendment a town board, acting as a lead agency, properly issued a negative declaration. In Matter of Matter of Gabrielli v Town of New Paltz, the Court noted that even though the zoning amendment was a SEQRA Type I action there was no need to prepare a DEIS.

However, in what appears to be somewhat of a departure from the standard for the findings of a lead agency to contain a "reasoned elaboration" supporting the negative declaration, the Court found:

"The negative declarations – adopted by resolutions of the Town Board – satisfied the requirement for "a written form containing a reasoned elaboration" for the determination and references to supporting documentation (6 NYCRR 617.7 [b] [4]). Although the resolutions themselves do not contain sufficient elaboration, they specifically refer to the EAF [FN1]. The EAF here consists of more than just checked boxes; the expanded additional comments on the EAF constitute a reasoned elaboration for the areas identified as potentially being affected by the floodplain laws (compare Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v Town of Nassau, 82 AD3d at 1379; Matter of Bauer v County of Tompkins, 57 AD3d 1151, 1153 [2008]). Because those comments relate to beneficial impacts, with no adverse impacts having been raised, the Town Board complied with its obligations under SEQRA."

-Steven M. Silverberg

Last week President Obama signed the ‘‘Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012’’ which included provisions limiting municipal authority over modification of existing telecommunications facilities.

The new provisions read as follows:

SEC. 6409. WIRELESS FACILITIES DEPLOYMENT.
(a) FACILITY MODIFICATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 704 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–104) or any other provision of law, a State or local government may not deny, and shall approve, any eligible facilities request for a modification of an existing wireless tower or base station that does not substantially change the physical dimensions of such tower or base station.
(2) ELIGIBLE FACILITIES REQUEST.—For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘‘eligible facilities request’’ means any request for modification of an existing wireless tower or base station that involves—
(A) collocation of new transmission equipment; (B) removal of transmission equipment; or
(C) replacement of transmission equipment.

-Steven M. Silverberg

The Appellate Division Fourth Department reversed the denial of a special permit when it found the denial to be based upon "generalized community objections." In Matter of Young Development, Inc. v. Town of West Senaca, the Court held:

"Contrary to respondents' contention, petitioners established that the sewer system of respondent Town of West Seneca would have sufficient capacity to support the project and, in any event, petitioners agreed to engage in remediation efforts recommended by the [*2]New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. There is no expert evidence in the record that the remediation proposed by petitioners is unsatisfactory. With respect to the comprehensive plan issue, it is well settled that the inclusion of a permitted use in a zoning code "is tantamount to a legislative finding that the permitted use is in harmony with the general zoning plan and will not adversely affect the neighborhood" (Matter of North Shore Steak House v Board of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Thomaston, 30 NY2d 238, 243). Given the absence of support in the record for the Board's determination, we conclude that the Board impermissibly based its determination on "generalized community objections" (Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d 304, 308). "

There is, however, one aspect of the decision which this writer finds puzzling. The Town raised the issue that the Article 78 proceeding was untimely because it was commenced more than thirty days after the decision denying the special permit. The Court found:

"Preliminarily, we reject respondents' contention that the petition was not timely filed within 30 days of the Board's determination pursuant to Town Law § 274-b (9). Rather, we conclude that, "[b]ecause the petition seeks to review the determination of the . . . Board, the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217 applies" (Matter of Sucato v Town Bd. of Boston, 187 AD2d 1045), thus rendering the petition timely filed."

Yet, Town Law 274-b states with regard to special permit applications:

"9. Court review. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the planning board or such other designated body or any officer, department, board or bureau of the town may apply to the supreme court for review by a proceeding under article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules. Such proceedings shall be instituted within thirty days after the filing of a decision by such board in the office of the town clerk."

-Steven M. Silverberg

A Local village's law requiring occupancy applications and inspection of rental units, before permiting occupancy, was held to be unconstitutional by the Appellate Division this week. In ATM One, LLC v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, the Court noted that the local law:

"required registration of each rental dwelling unit in the Village and a "rental occupancy permit" for each rental dwelling unit...the law (hereinafter chapter 106) requires a site inspection of "each rental dwelling unit": "The Superintendent of the Building Department or his or her delegate shall review each application for completeness and accuracy and shall make an on-site inspection of the proposed rental dwelling unit or units" (Village Code § 106-6)."

While noting that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality of legislative actions, the Court stated :

" In Sokolov v Village of Freeport (52 NY2d 341), the Court of Appeals examined a local ordinance that required rental permits similar to those required by the Village here. That ordinance, like the one at bar, required site inspections and certifications before a permit or renewal could be issued. The Court declared that "[i]t is beyond the power of the State to condition an owner's ability to engage his property in the business of residential rental upon his forced consent to forego certain rights guaranteed to him under the Constitution" (id. at 346), and it held that the ordinance was unconstitutional "insofar as it effectively authorizes and, indeed, requires a warrantless inspection of residential real property" (id.)."

Based upon the decision in Sokolov, the Court held that the Hempstead local law suffered from the same defect and was therefore unconstitutional.

-Steven M. Silverberg

The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of civil rights, based upon a claim of improper delay in issuing a certificate of occupancy for a house. In Matter of Zarabi v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, the Court found that the existence of unapproved changes in the construction served as a legitimate basis for the delay in issuing the certificate of occupancy.

As the Court noted:

"the defendants established, prima facie, that, inasmuch as there were building code violations on the property that needed to be corrected, which the plaintiff conceded, any delays in issuing the certificate of occupancy did not amount to egregious conduct so as to amount to a deprivation of the plaintiff's property interests without due process (see Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 628-629; Sonne v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Suffern, 67 AD3d 192, 202)."

The Court found the balance of Plaintiff's claims without merit.

-Steven Silverberg

The Appellate Division held that despite the fact that a parcel had been zoned for industrial use for fifty years, and that the Town's comprehensive plan designated the parcel for industrial use, a rezoning and change of the comprehensive plan to residential use of the parcel was a proper exercise of discretion. In Matter of Rotterdam Ventures, Inc. v Town Bd. of the Town of Rotterdam, the Court found the property in question had been used as a multifamily residential property for the period in question and the rezoning was consistent with the transitional nature of the site between an industrial use and a residential neighborhood.

The Petitioner owns an industrial site which was part of an army depot that also included the parcel in question that had been used to house military families. When the Respondent SYNC acquired the site in 2008 it first sought a variance, which was denied and then petitioned for a rezoning, which was granted. The Town issued a SEQRA negative declaration finding that the rezoning was consistent with the current use of the property and would have fewer impacts than the potential use as an industrial site under the existing zoning.

The Court upheld the SEQRA determination and found that the rezoning did not, as Petitioner claimed, constitute spot zoning. Rather, the court found the fact that prior revisions to the comprehensive plan did not suggest a residential use of the property was not proof of spot zoning, because "although the property abuts a portion of petitioner's industrial park, it also projects into an area of predominantly residential use. The Town, including its senior planner, concluded that rezoning the property so as to permit its continued use for residential purposes would benefit the community by retaining a transitional area between residential/commercial and industrial zones, whereas industrial use of the property would create an incongruity with the character of the existing neighborhood. Petitioner's reliance on the Town's failure to rezone the property as part of the 2001 and 2009 revisions of the comprehensive plan is misplaced, as the studies that supported that revision did not include an evaluation of SYNC's property. According to the Town's senior planner who oversaw the revisions, the industrial zoning classification for this property was simply continued without discussion or analysis."

Thus, the Court concluded that Petitioner had failed to prove the rezoning and change in the comprehensive plan was unlawful.

-Steven M. Silverberg

The Appellate Division directed that the Town of Oyster Bay file a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and take final action upon a special permit application by Costco. In the Matter of Costco Wholesale Corporation, v. Town Board of the Town of Oyster Bay, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court judgment directing that the Town "complete environmental review of the petitioners' proposal to develop a retail store, and to take final action upon the petitioners' applications for a special use permit and site plan."

This case involves an application for site plan and a special permit that has been going on since 2001. In 2003 the Town denied the application and thereafter the Supreme Court remitted the matter for the Town to comply with SEQRA. The Town then issued a positive declaration, a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was prepared and a hearing held in January 2007, with the public comment period being closed on January 31, 2007. Costco made three submissions of a proposed FEIS, the last being in April 2009 and then started this Article 78 proceeding, seeking to compel the Town to complete the SEQRA process and make a decision on the special permit and site plan applications.

In upholding the lower court's direction that the Town complete SEQRA and issue a determination on the applications, the Court held:

"Contrary to the Town's contentions, the Supreme Court properly determined that the Town's failure to act pursuant to the applicable local code provision (see Code of the Town of Oyster Bay § 110-9 [I]), as well as the applicable SEQRA provision (see 6 NYCRR 617.9[a][5]) requiring it to "prepare or cause to be prepared and . . . file a final EIS, within 45 calendar days after the close of any hearing or within 60 calendar days after the filing of the draft EIS, whichever occurs later," warranted mandamus relief (id.; see Matter of Mamaroneck Beach & Yacht Club, Inc. v Fraioli, 24 AD3d 669, 671; Matter of 2433 Knapp St. Rest. Bar v Department of Consumer Affairs of City of N.Y., 150 AD2d 464, 465)."

-Steven M. Silverberg

The Appellate Division held that the filing of a zoning board's minutes, rather than the subsequent filing of the zoning board's formal decision, commenced the running of thirty day statue of limitations for challenging that decision. In Matter of 92 MM Motel, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Newburgh, the court found that, as the minutes of the meeting reflected the vote of each member of the zoning board, the filing of the minutes commenced the running of the statute of limitations. The court therefore concluded that the commencement of an Article 78 proceeding within 30 days of the filing of the formal decision was time barred when the minutes were filed with the Town Clerk more than thirty days prior to the commencement of the action.

-Steven Silverberg