New York Zoning and Municipal Law Blog

In upholding the decision of a zoning board denying an area variance, the Appellate Division in Fowlkes v Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of North Hempstead noted that the variance could not have been limited in time to the term of ownership of the present applicant. Instead the Court noted: “the variances could not be limited to the term of her ownership of the premises because any condition imposed when granting a variance must be directly related to the property involved and to the underlying purpose of the zoning code, without consideration of the particular person owning or occupying it.”

This week the Appellate Division, Second Department reiterated the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the importance of a clear record in the proceedings of zoning boards. In Matter of Kaufman v Incorporated Village of Kings Point, the building inspector had determined that the lot in question had the required lot area but lacked sufficient lot width and lot frontage. The property owners applied to the zoning board for the necessary variances, which was opposed by neighbors. Based largely on a statement by the Village attorney that similar applications had been granted in the past, the zoning board granted the application.

The neighbors brought an Article 78 proceeding challenging the variances and for the first time claimed that the lot in question did not have the required lot area. In modifying the decision of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division held this issue should not have been considered as it was neither a question of law nor “apparent from the face of the record.” The Court noted that in an Article 78 proceeding the court’s review is “limited to the arguments and record adduced before the agency” and that a litigant is require to exhaust all possible relief through administrative review before resorting to the courts.

However the Court still remitted the case to the zoning board noting that it was not clear from the record that the zoning board had considered the five factor balancing test required by Village Law section 7-712 (b) in granting the variances. Further, on the contention that the zoning board was compelled to follow its precedent in granting similar variances, the Court found: “other than the conclusory statement from the Village Attorney, it was never established that applications for area variances involving similar factual circumstances had been granted in the past….”

The case acts as a reminder of two important and related points: (1) the zoning board has to make a clear record of the reasons for its decision and (2) those appearing before a zoning board have to make a clear record of the relevant issues. Absent a well developed record the court will either reject the arguments outright or remit the matter for further proceedings.

A zoning amendment which permitted hot mix asphalt facilities as a special use in all industrial districts in the Town of Babylon was held not to be spot zoning by the Appellate Division this week. In the case, Matter of Little Joseph Realty, Inc. v Town Board of the Town of Babylon, the court found the amendment was not enacted to benefit a single owner for a specific purpose only.

The Court noted that spot zoning is “the process of singling out a small parcel of land, for a use classification totally different from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of such property and to the detriment of other owners.” In affirming the decision of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division found that the lower court had correctly determined that “the zoning amendments did not allow for a use that was different from that allowed in the surrounding area and was in conformity with the comprehensive plan calculated to serve the general welfare of the community.”

Due to a busy litigation schedule, we fell short in reporting a number of SEQRA and zoning cases that came down during March of 2008. So we thought we would provide a brief summary of some of the cases decided by New York appellate courts during March of 2008, in case you missed them also.

Rossi v. Town Bd. of Ballston, 2008 NY Slip Op 02740 (3d Dep’t Mar. 27, 2008). SEQRA-the burden is on the party challenging a SEQRA determination to provide evidence to refute expert testimony.

Muir v. Town of Newburgh Planning Board, 2008 NY Slip Op 02596 (2d Dep’t Mar. 18, 2008). SEQRA-a full review of environmental impacts of a prior proposal that did not proceed was sufficient for a SEQRA “hard look” at a new scaled down proposal for the same site.

Allstate Properties, LLC v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Vill. of Hempstead, 2008 WL 669808; 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 02412 (Mar. 11, 2008). Area Variances-the five part balancing test before granting an area variance.

Joann London v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 2008 WL 740523; 2008 NY Slip Op 02593 (2d Dep’t Mar. 18, 2008). Variance precedent- zoning board properly distinguished prior variance requests in denying a request for a lot area variance.

Red Hook /Gowanis Chamber of Commerce v. NYC Bd. of Standards and Appeals, 2008 WL 740514; 2008 NY Slip Op 02600 (March 18, 2008). Use Variance- what constitutes “dollars and cents” proof.

The Appellate Division, Second Department rejected as unreasonable a condition on an area variance that a parking lot be chained at night to prevent overnight parking. In Matter of Voetsch v. Craven the petitioner sought area variances for a parking lot adjacent to a professional office.

The Zoning Board denied a variance for a 4 foot stockade fence but granted the other area variances for the parking lot, contingent upon petitioner putting a chain at the entrance at night to prevent overnight parking on the lot when the offices were not open. The Court upheld the denial of the stockade fence but reversed that portion of the decision which required the chain across the lot at night to prevent parking.

The Court noted that a zoning board may impose reasonable conditions “directly related to and incidental to the proposed use” but that unreasonable conditions must be annulled. The court found that a condition preventing overnight parking was reasonable to minimize adverse impacts on the neighborhood. However, it held “there was no such rational basis” for also having to chain the parking lot. The decision is silent as to why the court found this condition unreasonable. This writer suspects that other parking lots in the town are not required to be chained to prevent overnight parking and that this was a unique requirement for this specific property.

In upholding the rejection of a draft environmental impact statement submitted pursuant to SEQRA, the appellate division reiterated the long standing rule that when a zoning law is amended, after submission of an application and before a decision, the courts must apply the new law and there is no vested right in development under the old law. In Matter of Jul-Bet Enterprises, LLC v. Town Board of Town of Riverhead, the Appellate Division Second Department also noted that the failure to act, as required, within 45 days of submission of the DEIS did not constitute an automatic acceptance of the DEIS.

Last week the Appellate Division Second Department reversed and remitted for retrial a 42 USC 1983 regulatory takings claim in the case Noghrey v. Town of Brookhaven. Plaintiff had purchased 2 parcels in 1985 that were zoned for shopping plazas with the intention of building shopping plazas. After adopting a moratorium to study the zoning of these parcels and others, the Town rezoned plaintiff’s property to residential use. Plaintiff then brought a regulatory takings claim. A trial was held and the jury found a partial taking based upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in Penn. Cent. Transportation v. City of New York.

The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the case for a new trial finding that the jury charge on the takings issue was inadequate. The Court stated that for there to be even a partial taking, the diminution in value must be “one step short of complete.” Noting that courts have rejected cases where the diminution in value even “approached or exceeded 90% of the pre-regulation value” the Court found the trial court failed to explain to the jury the true standard to be applied.

In remitting the case the Court ordered a new trial and directed that the trial court instruct the jury that “mere diminution in value” is not adequate to prove a taking. Rather the jury should be instructed that the test is whether the regulation has left only a “bare residue” of economic value.

Finding that a zoning board had “improperly succumbed to community pressure,” the Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the lower court’s reversal of the denial of an area variance. In the case of Schumacher v. Town of East Hampton Zoning Board of Appeals, the Court noted the limited nature of judicial review of zoning board decisions but found that the zoning board’s actions were arbitrary.

In reversing the zoning board, the Court found that the proposed reconstruction of the applicant’s home would actually be an increase of the existing setback from the wetlands at issue and that all of the lots surrounding the property were “nonconforming in terms of the applicable requirements for setbacks from wetlands.” The court concluded that the zoning board’s determination that the house should be decreased in size was “irrational.”

The Appellate Division Fourth Department reversed the granting of a site plan approval where it found that three planning board members had “impermissibly prejudged” an application. In Schweichler v. Village of Caledonia the court dismissed claims of improper spot zoning and violations of SEQRA but remitted the site plan application for further review by the planning board stating “the appearance of bias and actual bias in this case require annulment of the Planning Board’s site plan approval.”

The court noted that three members of the planning board had signed a petition in favor of rezoning the property. Further, the chair had “manifested actual bias” when she wrote to the Mayor supporting the rezoning. Her letter went so far as to state that she would like to see the new housing made available to her so she could sell her home. To further seal the fate of the application, the court found that there were no measurements provided to demonstrate compliance with the Village Code.

How to hold further hearings on an application where the court found three of the members were biased? The court noted that Village Law section 7-718 (16)(b) permits designation by the chair of alternate members and directed that an acting chair perform the duties of the chair pursuant to Village Law section 7-718 (10).

The New York Court of Appeals held today in Haberman v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Long Beach that the attorney representing the zoning board may extend the time to commence construction under the terms of a variance without action by the zoning board. The Court held, absent proof that the attorney had acted in violation of instructions from the zoning board there is no statutory prohibition against the attorney extending the time to begin building.

While action by a zoning board is required to grant a variance, the Court found there was no statutory requirement for a new hearing to extend the time to commence construction permitted by the variance. Therefore, where the variance required that construction commence within a specified time period, the attorney representing the board could grant an extension of time.

The failure to analyze the environmental impacts of a sewerage diversion plan formed the basis for the Appellate Division Second Department voiding a zoning amendment in Matter of ACI Shore Rd., LLC v. Incorporated Village of Great Neck. The Village of Great Neck had proposed a zoning amendment to implement a residential Waterfront Development District in an area which had previously been an industrial zone. At the same time the Village was considering decommissioning two sewerage treatment plants in the area and diverting the sewerage to a plant 16 miles away.

The Court found that the DGEIS for the new zone included a conceptual site plan replacing the sewerage treatment plants with a mixed use development and waterfront park. Yet, except for noting generally that it was anticipated the diversion of sewerage would have beneficial impacts, the Court noted “despite the apparent interrelatedness of the redevelopment plan and sewerage diversion plan, neither the DGEIS nor the FGEIS contained any analysis of potential environmental impacts of the sewerage diversion plan.”

Therefore the Court found that the environmental review had been improperly segmented as the potential impacts of the sewerage diversion plan should have been considered and noted the “record belies” the claim by the Village that “the sewerage diversion plan was speculative, hypothetical, or not part of a larger unified plan.” Finally, the Court held that the Village failed to take a “hard look” at other potential impacts. Rather than analyzing impacts of proposed dredging and soil remediation, which were part of the overall project, the DGEIS, FGEIS and SEQRA findings statement contained no analysis of these issues.

In a comprehensive review of the capacity and standing of one municipality to sue another over local zoning, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Town of Ramapo, held that villages have the capacity to sue a town over a local law enacting a zoning amendment. Yet the Court also found their standing is limited to SEQRA and General Municipal Law compliance rather than the local law’s consistency with a comprehensive plan.

The Town had adopted a zoning amendment by local law which permitted adult student housing. The law applied to four parcels of land near or adjacent to the boundary of four Villages located in the Town. The four villages and two individuals commenced a combined Article 78/declaratory judgment action challenging the local law, and subsequent actions which incorporated the local law. The lower court dismissed the action on a cross motion by the Town finding lack of capacity to sue and/or lack of standing on each of the causes of action. The Appellate Division modified.

First, the Court noted that Village Law specifically authorizes Villages to sue and be sued. The Town had argued that Town Law Section 264 provides that a village may not challenge a Town’s zoning in court. The Court distinguished a zoning amendment adopted pursuant to Town Law from a case such as this with a local law enacting a zoning regulation under Municipal Home Rule Law. The court found that Municipal Home Rule Law did not similarly restrict a challenge by a village.

More importantly the Court noted that SEQRA had been adopted and implemented after both the provisions of Town Law and Municipal Home Rule Law. The Court held that an abutting municipality as an interested agency (rather than an involved agency which automatically has standing) had the same right to challenge a SEQRA determination as an individual, although the test of standing is somewhat different.

In analyzing the standing of the Villages the Court found that while mere proximity was not enough by itself to create standing, the proposed development on the border of the Villages was substantial and could have a significant detrimental impact. In this case there was a claim that the Villages share much of their infrastructure with the Town. Noting that SEQRA specifically seeks to protect community character the Court held the “power to define community character is a unique prerogative of a municipality acting in its governmental capacity”. Therefore the Court held the Villages had standing under SEQRA to challenge the Town’s actions. In addition the Court found standing to enforce General Municipal Law provisions relating to procedural requirements for adoption of local laws. But the Court found the Villages had no interest in enforcing the procedural requirements related to the adoption of the zoning under Municipal Home Rule Law or with respect to compliance with the Town’s comprehensive plan finding “they are beyond the bounds of the mutuality of restriction and benefit that underlies the comprehensive plan requirement. The matter was remitted to the lower court for a determination on the merits of the causes of action that survived.

The Appellate Division found that a site plan approval obtained in the early 1970’s did not create a vested right in the zoning that was subsequently amended, even though 204 of the 330 approved units were constructed and funds were expended on infrastructure that would have served the second phase of development. In the case of RC Enterprises v. Town of Patterson, the Appellate Division, Second Department found the petitioner, who had purchased the property in 1979 from the original developer of the first phase, had abandoned the plan to develop the second phase “as demonstrated by its failure to act over a period of decades.”

In concluding there were no vested rights, the Court restated the rule that in seeking to claim vested rights in a permit after zoning has changed there must be substantial expenditures and substantial construction under the original zoning. Therefore a landowner must demonstrate its actions were: “so substantial that the municipal action withdrawing the permit results in serious loss.” The Court found that although there was a contention that certain improvements for phase 1 of the development were built with extra capacity to serve phase 2, the improvements had been used for nearly 30 years to benefit phase 1 and in the case of a sewerage treatment plant there were additional improvements mandated after construction in order to just serve phase 1.

The rule in New York has long been that if enough work can be completed that may only be used under the proposed permit the rights in the existing zoning have vested. There is now a clear message that the project also has to be completed as vesting does not last forever.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a decision by the district court that found a property owner was not bound by a restriction contained in an old subdivision and that the Town had violated the property owners’ rights by refusing to issue a certificate of occupancy for a house on the property (O’Mara v Town of Wappinger). At the heart of the case is whether, under New York law, a notation on a subdivision map that was never recorded in the chain of title to the property binds subsequent purchasers of that property.

The O’Mara’s, as a result of a tax foreclosure, purchased vacant land for which they received a building permit for a house and temporary certificate of occupancy before the Town declared that the land was supposed to be retained as vacant open space and issued a stop work order. The lot in question was part of a 1963 subdivision which contained a notation that the lot was “open space”. Yet there was no other record in the county clerk’s office that would alert a purchaser of any restriction and the map was not recorded in land records in the manner of a deed so that it would appear in a search of the title.

The Circuit Court held that it could find no case law on the issue of whether such an open space restriction, noted solely on a subdivision map, is binding on subsequent purchasers. It therefore certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals. Having concluded there was no clear answer to that question, the Court also reversed the finding of the district court that the refusal by the Town to issue a certificate of occupancy was a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Instead the Court held that, as the meaning of the law was uncertain, the O’Mara’s had no “clear entitlement”. The Court held that even were the New York Court of Appeals to subsequently determine the 1963 open space restriction is not binding “the uncertainty that leads us to certify this issue means the O’Maras did not have a ‘clear entitlement’ to a certificate of occupancy and therefore no cognizable property interest that would support a violation of their right to substantive due process”.

The Appellate Division Second Department reversed the denial of an area variance where the Zoning Board previously granted a similar variance and gave no reason for a contrary result. In Matter of Aliperti v Trotta, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Brookhaven denied an area variance for the size of a home after it had previously granted the same variance for the adjoining parcel several years earlier.

The Court found that the Board “articulated no rational basis for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts”. It therefore reversed the determination of the Zoning Board denying the area variance.

A Court held that a challenge to the imposition of fees for the services of engineers and attorneys retained by a town to review and assess the petitioner’s application for approval of a subdivision must be brought within four months of the date the Town unambiguously notified the petitioner that payment was required and the application would not proceed until the petitioner paid the fees.

In an action to recover some of the fees paid, the Appellate Division Third Department, in Properties of New York, Inc. v. Planning Board of the Town of Stuyvesant, noted the Court of Appeals has established a two-part test for when an administrative action is final and binding: “First, the agency must have reached a definitive position on the issue that inflicts actual, concrete injury and second, the injury inflicted may not be prevented or significantly ameliorated either by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party.”

The petitioner had argued that the charging of the fees was part of the subdivision approval process and would not be complete until the final plat was endorsed. The Court held the endorsement of the plat did not alter the petitioner’s obligation to pay and, therefore, the court found the petitioner suffered the concrete injury when the fees were imposed, rather than when the final approval of the plat was granted. There was no alternative or opportunity for amelioration because there was a definite obligation to pay the fees. Finally, the court held that the petitioner’s demand for an audit and return of fees paid was effectively a request for reconsideration and did not extend the statute of limitations.

Effective January 1, 2007 (Chapter 662 of the laws of 2006) the New York State Legislature has amended the General Municipal Law, Town Law, General City Law and Village Law to require four hours per year of training for each member of a local Planning Board and Zoning Board of Appeals, including the county planning board. Time spent in training in excess of four hours per year may be carried over to subsequent years.

The training may be traditional classroom or other formats, including video. Reappointment to the local board is conditioned upon completion of the required training. The law also provides that each local legislature must approve the training provided to local board members but also permits the local legislative body to modify the training requirements in the “best interests” of the community.