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The Appellate Division found that a site plan approval obtained in the early 1970’s did not create a vested right in the zoning that was subsequently amended, even though 204 of the 330 approved units were constructed and funds were expended on infrastructure that would have served the second phase of development. In the case of RC Enterprises v. Town of Patterson, the Appellate Division, Second Department found the petitioner, who had purchased the property in 1979 from the original developer of the first phase, had abandoned the plan to develop the second phase “as demonstrated by its failure to act over a period of decades.”

In concluding there were no vested rights, the Court restated the rule that in seeking to claim vested rights in a permit after zoning has changed there must be substantial expenditures and substantial construction under the original zoning. Therefore a landowner must demonstrate its actions were: “so substantial that the municipal action withdrawing the permit results in serious loss.” The Court found that although there was a contention that certain improvements for phase 1 of the development were built with extra capacity to serve phase 2, the improvements had been used for nearly 30 years to benefit phase 1 and in the case of a sewerage treatment plant there were additional improvements mandated after construction in order to just serve phase 1.

The rule in New York has long been that if enough work can be completed that may only be used under the proposed permit the rights in the existing zoning have vested. There is now a clear message that the project also has to be completed as vesting does not last forever.

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In what the Appellate Division, Second Department called a case of first impression, the court has ruled an attempt by the Village of Haverstraw to acquire a property by condemnation for affordable housing violated the Eminent Domain Procedure Law. In the case 49 WB, LLC v. Village of Haverstraw the court found the Village failed to demonstrate a public purpose.

The Village proposed to condemn the property at issue for acquisition by a local not-for- profit, HOGAR. In finding that the acquisition of the property had a public purpose the Village had determined that (1) HOGAR would provide a community outreach health center, (2) provide an office for HOGAR and (3) the site would be suitable to construct 16 units of affordable housing. The Court found: (1) the Village failed to demonstrate that HOGAR was more likely to provide a community outreach health center than the current owner who had a plan for such use and therefore “failed to articulate how or in what manner the condemnation …fosters any benefit to the public which would not be obtained absent condemnation”; (2)HOGAR already leased space in the building and the owner had offered a long term lease, further “there is no foundational support in the record to conclude that any “public” benefit would flow from having a private, not-for-profit corporation such as HOGAR be an owner of its office space rather than a tenant”; and (3) the condemnation, through a complex analysis outlined below, actually results in fewer affordable housing units for the Village.

The Court found that the entire affordable housing argument was tied to a private development of the Village’s waterfront. The Court noted that in exchange for permission to construct a large development on the Village’s waterfront, the waterfront developer was required to “participate” in the development of 85 units of affordable housing. The developer intended to contribute to HOGAR’s acquisition of the property and therefore, the Court found, would get credit for participating in the 16 units of affordable housing HOGAR proposed for the site. This would reduce the developer’s obligation to build affordable housing by the 16 units. But the Court found that the present owner already proposed 6 units of affordable housing on the site which, unlike HOGAR’s proposal, did not include “participation” by the developer and would not be credited to the developer’s requirement of 85 units. Therefore, by pursuing the condemnation and giving the developer credit for HOGAR’s 16 units, the Village was actually losing the 6 additional units that would have been constructed by the owner of the property. The Court concluded allowing the present owner to construct 6 units would net the Village 91 units of affordable housing rather than 85. Thus the purported public purpose of providing more affordable housing was illusory.

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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a decision by the district court that found a property owner was not bound by a restriction contained in an old subdivision and that the Town had violated the property owners’ rights by refusing to issue a certificate of occupancy for a house on the property (O’Mara v Town of Wappinger). At the heart of the case is whether, under New York law, a notation on a subdivision map that was never recorded in the chain of title to the property binds subsequent purchasers of that property.

The O’Mara’s, as a result of a tax foreclosure, purchased vacant land for which they received a building permit for a house and temporary certificate of occupancy before the Town declared that the land was supposed to be retained as vacant open space and issued a stop work order. The lot in question was part of a 1963 subdivision which contained a notation that the lot was “open space”. Yet there was no other record in the county clerk’s office that would alert a purchaser of any restriction and the map was not recorded in land records in the manner of a deed so that it would appear in a search of the title.

The Circuit Court held that it could find no case law on the issue of whether such an open space restriction, noted solely on a subdivision map, is binding on subsequent purchasers. It therefore certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals. Having concluded there was no clear answer to that question, the Court also reversed the finding of the district court that the refusal by the Town to issue a certificate of occupancy was a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Instead the Court held that, as the meaning of the law was uncertain, the O’Mara’s had no “clear entitlement”. The Court held that even were the New York Court of Appeals to subsequently determine the 1963 open space restriction is not binding “the uncertainty that leads us to certify this issue means the O’Maras did not have a ‘clear entitlement’ to a certificate of occupancy and therefore no cognizable property interest that would support a violation of their right to substantive due process”.

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Construction within the New York City Watershed located in Putnam County is regulated, in part, by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The New York Court of Appeals, in Nilsson v Dept. of Environmental Protection, limited the authority of DEP to regulate storm water runoff when reviewing a request for a variance from the fill requirements for the subsurface sewage treatment systems (SSTS) of a residence within the watershed.

The Court found that the DEP could not “extend its jurisdiction to otherwise unregulated sources of degradation or contamination.” The Court also found that the DEP could not require the applicant to prove hardship by evidence of projected financial hardship when the submissions by the applicant demonstrated that it would be impossible to construct any residence without the variances. Therefore the Court found that where there was a hardship claimed of impossibility of building a residence on the parcel “there is little more to be said.”

However, the Court remitted the matter to the Supreme Court. During the review process DEP had asked for information concerning the applicant’s real estate holdings in the immediate area, which the applicant refused to provide. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division’s finding that such a request was over broad. Yet, the Court did find that it was reasonable to request information about ownership of contiguous lots, which might allow the applicant to minimize any hardship. As a result the Court directed that there be further proceedings on that issue.

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The Appellate Division Second Department recently held that the failure to file a timely notice of claim, as required by the General Municipal Law, should not be excused in the case of Narcisse v. Village of Central Islip.

The Court noted that General Municipal Law section 50-e requires that within 90 days of the event giving rise to a tort claim a party making such a claim must file a notice of claim with the municipality. The purpose is to provide the municipality a timely opportunity to investigate the claim. However, if there is a failure to file such a notice the law allows a party to seek leave of the court to file a late notice. The party seeking leave of the court must address certain factors such as a reasonable excuse for failing to file, lack of prejudice to the municipality and most particularly whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the occurrence.

The Court denied this application finding that the municipality had no knowledge of the occurrence and the petitioner had failed to demonstrate there would be no prejudice to the municipality. In addition, the petitioner had not sought legal advice until the 90 day period had expired and the Court found that ignorance of the law is no excuse for failing to comply.

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The Appellate Division found that a condemnation proceeding under the Eminent Domain Law in order to enhance a golf course and for other recreational purposes was proper in the case Matter of Rocky Point Realty v Town of Brookhaven. The Court found that review of a condemnation proceeding is limited to four issues: “whether (1) the proceeding was in conformity with the federal and state constitutions, (2) the proposed acquisition was within the condemnor’s statutory jurisdiction or authority, (3) the condemnor’s determinations and findings were made in accordance with procedures set forth in EDPL article 2 and SEQRA, and (4) a public use, benefit or purpose will be served by the proposed acquisition…”.

The property owner’s contention that EDPL 202, which requires that the purpose of the hearing conducted by the Town be stated in the notice, also mandates a description of every aspect of the project and its implementation was rejected by the Court. It was held that the proposed condemnation would serve a legitimate public purpose by enhancing recreation in the Town and therefore met the test of being a “public use”.

Finally, the Court noted that the Town complied with SEQRA. It found that, as the EAF failed to identify any potential adverse impacts and the petitioner failed to identify any significant potential for environmental harm, the Town took the requisite hard look and properly issued a negative declaration.

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The Appellate Division Second Department reversed the denial of an area variance where the Zoning Board previously granted a similar variance and gave no reason for a contrary result. In Matter of Aliperti v Trotta, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Brookhaven denied an area variance for the size of a home after it had previously granted the same variance for the adjoining parcel several years earlier.

The Court found that the Board “articulated no rational basis for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts”. It therefore reversed the determination of the Zoning Board denying the area variance.

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A Court has ruled that the issuance of a demolition permit is not an “action” within the meaning of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) that requires review under SEQRA. In Matter of Ziemba v. City of Troy, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the discretion to be exercised in issuing a demolition permit under the Troy Code “is limited to a narrow set of criteria that is unrelated to the environmental concerns that would be raised in an EIS”.

The SEQRA regulations provide that purely ministerial acts requiring no exercise of discretion are exempt from review under SEQRA. The Court concluded the real inquiry in determining if an action is exempt from SEQRA review is whether the factors to be considered by the permitting agency could trigger issues that would be raised in an environmental impact statement (“EIS”). The Court found SEQRA requires a determination of whether “the underlying regulatory scheme invests the authorizing agency with discretion to act or refuse to act based upon the type of information contained in an EIS”. Therefore, the Court found that an action for which an agency has discretion that is narrowly circumscribed by factors that do not bear any relationship to information that may be contained in an EIS is not an action requiring review under SEQRA.

Here the Court analyzed the nature of the discretion of the permitting authority in issuing a demolition permit under the City of Troy Code and concluded that the discretion to be exercised did not involve issues that would be reviewed by an EIS. Accordingly, the permit could not be denied on SEQRA grounds.

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A State Supreme Court Judge found that the Long Beach New York ordinance governing sales from food carts was unconstitutionally vague. In Party Magic Enterprises, Inc. v. City of New Rochelle, the plaintiff, who held a peddlers license from the city which permitted sale of food from a cart, challenged the local ordinance’s restriction on how long a peddler may keep his cart in the same location.

The challenged language required that the holder of a license may not “stand or permit the unmotorized vehicle used by him … to stand in a fixed location in any public place or street for more than five (5) minutes.”

The Court held that the ordinance was vague as the failure to define the distance a peddler must move every five minutes did not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that contemplated conduct is forbidden and subjected the ordinance to arbitrary enforcement. It reasoned that one police officer might find that moving 100 feet was sufficient to comply with the law while another officer might conclude a greater distance was required. The court noted that several similar ordinances specify the distance that must be moved periodically and such a modification would cure the deficiency in this ordinance.

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A Court held that a challenge to the imposition of fees for the services of engineers and attorneys retained by a town to review and assess the petitioner’s application for approval of a subdivision must be brought within four months of the date the Town unambiguously notified the petitioner that payment was required and the application would not proceed until the petitioner paid the fees.

In an action to recover some of the fees paid, the Appellate Division Third Department, in Properties of New York, Inc. v. Planning Board of the Town of Stuyvesant, noted the Court of Appeals has established a two-part test for when an administrative action is final and binding: “First, the agency must have reached a definitive position on the issue that inflicts actual, concrete injury and second, the injury inflicted may not be prevented or significantly ameliorated either by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party.”

The petitioner had argued that the charging of the fees was part of the subdivision approval process and would not be complete until the final plat was endorsed. The Court held the endorsement of the plat did not alter the petitioner’s obligation to pay and, therefore, the court found the petitioner suffered the concrete injury when the fees were imposed, rather than when the final approval of the plat was granted. There was no alternative or opportunity for amelioration because there was a definite obligation to pay the fees. Finally, the court held that the petitioner’s demand for an audit and return of fees paid was effectively a request for reconsideration and did not extend the statute of limitations.

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