Published on:

Actual knowledge that another person is the title owner does not alone defeat an adverse possessor’s claim. In Walling v. Przybylo the Court of Appeals affirmed an order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-adverse possessors.

Plaintiff Walling commenced an action to quiet title upon learning that defendant Przybylo had the land surveyed and Przybylo had discovered that he had title to the disputed parcel. The county court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment finding that Walling had satisfied the requirements of adverse possession. In affirming the lower court’s finding of adverse possession, the Court of Appeals noted that defendants did not seek to assert their rights to the disputed parcel until almost fifteen years after they had purchased the property. The Court rejected the claim by defendants that plaintiffs’ knowledge of defendants’ ownership of the disputed parcel barred the adverse possession claim since plaintiffs otherwise met the criteria necessary to prove adverse possession,

Published on:

New York’s highest court declined to apply the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in finding a religious institution’s use of a lot zoned for “conference and training facilities” is permitted under local zoning. In Town of Mount Pleasant v. Legion of Christ, Inc., the Town appealed an Appellate Division decision, which held that the Legion’s use complied with the Town’s Code, and that the Town’s interpretation of the Code as prohibiting the Legion’s use violated RLUIPA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that the Legion’s use is permitted by the Town’s Code, but did not reach the RLUIPA claim.

The Town argued that because the Legion offered a two-year course of study, rather than shorter-term courses as the lot’s previous owner had, the Legion’s use of the parcel is more accurately described as a college or seminary than as a conference and training center. The Court rejected the Town’s argument, reasoning that the Code does not specify a time limit for visitors to the lot. The Court noted that the Code prohibits “hotel or restaurant” use, but reasoned that this indicates that the town seeks to prohibit shorter-term, rather than longer-term guests.

Further, the Court held that it did not have to decide RLUIPA questions raised in the lower court because the action was instituted before RLUIPA was enacted and the issue of whether the Legion’s use was permissible under the Town’s Code did not require a determination under RLUIPA.

Published on:

A court may not require a town board to reach a determination on, or even consider an application for a zoning change. In Matter of Richard M. Wolff v. Town/Village of Harrison, the Appellate Division Second Department dismissed petitioner’s request for judgment compelling the town board to reach a determination on the petitioner’s application for a zoning change as soon as reasonably possible.

The petitioner had applied for a zone change and the town board had refused to make a decision on the request. The petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking to compel the town board to make a decision on the requested zone change. The court reasoned that the petitioner’s Article 78 proceeding could only be brought to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act where there is a clear legal right to the relief sought (writ of mandamus). Since the amendment of a zoning ordinance is a purely legislative function, a court may not compel a board to consider or decide upon a zoning change by ordering a writ of mandamus. In addition, the court recognized that the statute establishing the procedure for zone changes vests broad legislative power in a town board and does not require the board to vote upon every application for a zoning change.

Published on:

An appellate court dismissed five consolidated actions challenging New York City’s and the MTA’s use of eminent domain to obtain land for a project on Manhattan’s West Side. In Matter of C/S 12th Ave. LLC v. City of New York, the Appellate Division First Department upheld the City’s approval of property acquisition and easements related to the project, as well as the Determination and Findings generated by the City and the MTA. The court also held that condemnation of an entire parcel is reasonable where the project for which the parcel is sought only requires a portion of the parcel, but partial demolition of the existing structure is not feasible.

Owners of property subject to condemnation for the project, which is known as the No. 7 Subway Extension Hudson Yards Rezoning and Redevelopment Program, challenged the City’s authority to acquire their land. Petitioners’ numerous claims include arguments that the City failed to comply with requirements of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law, engaged in unconstitutional spot zoning, acted ultra vires, and failed to state an adequate public use to be served by the project.

The court held that Eminent Domain Procedure Law 204 does not require “extreme accuracy” in reference to the property to be acquired; rather the procedural requirement is satisfied when the acquiring agency sets forth the approximate location and the reasons for the location selection for the proposed project. In reaching its determination that specificity is not required, the court pointed out that the taking challenged in the EDPL claim is a temporary easement needed to construct and support portions of the project. In addition, the court reasoned, the easements were sought for structural stabilization of the subway tunnel during its construction, and precisely where the stabilization points would be required could not be determined in the planning stage of the project.

Published on:

In a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, an appellate court held that where a zoning board provides a rational explanation for denying a variance, the determination will not be viewed as either arbitrary or capricious even if a variance has been granted to another property on similar facts. In Matter of Ronald Berk v .Richard McMahon, the Appellate Division Second Department upheld the Zoning Board of the Village of Southampton’s refusal to grant a wetlands special permit and area variances.

The appellate court considered the zoning board’s reasoning in upholding its action. In determining whether to grant an area variance, the board engaged the required balancing test, weighing the benefit to the applicant against the detriment to the health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood or community in the event the variance is granted. The board also satisfied a statutory requirement by examining whether (1) an undesirable change in the character of the neighborhood will result, or a detriment to nearby properties will be created by the granting of the area variance, (2) the benefit sought by the applicant can be achieved by some feasible method, other than an area variance, (3) the required area variance is substantial, (4) the proposed variance will have an adverse impact on environmental conditions in the neighborhood or district, and (5) the alleged difficulty was self-created.

Supplying a rational explanation for refusing to grant a variance is therefore sufficient to validate the action; the board is not required to grant the variance solely because one has been granted in the jurisdiction in similar circumstances. Judicial review of a board decision is limited in scope to a determination of whether the board’s action violated lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In this instance the court upheld the Southampton Board decision based on a finding that it has some objective factual basis in the record and did not entirely rest on subjective considerations.

Published on:

An appellate court held that a planning board abused its discretion by amending a SEQRA draft environmental impact statement based on the board’s concern that the proposed subdivision was inconsistent with the goals of a recently implemented voluntary program giving area landowners incentives to conserve agricultural property. In Matter of Two Trees Farm, Inc. v. Planning Board of Town of Southampton the Appellate Division Second Department modified and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court, deleting a provision directing the planning board to approve the application for preliminary subdivision approval.

In reviewing the planning board’s action, the court noted that the board did not amend the DEIS because the statement failed to adequately address adverse environmental impacts, rather the board’s amendment was based on a concern not falling under SEQRA, and therefore the court found the amendment to be improper.

Amendments to a DEIS must address adverse environmental impacts in order to be valid. A planning board may not approve an EIS based on improper amendments to a DEIS. In Matter of Two Trees Farm the appellate court held that the court below correctly annulled the planning board’s decision to accept the final EIS and other actions subsequent to the amendment because all steps taken after the amendment were based on the improper amendment. The court further found that the Supreme Court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the planning board when it directed the board to approve the preliminary subdivision application.

Published on:

An appellate court agreed with Silverberg Zalantis LLC that the zone changes implemented by the Village of Lake Grove did not require a full environmental impact statement before a SEQRA negative declaration could be issued. In Matter of Lake Grove Partners LLC v. Middleton, the Appellate Division Second Department upheld the lower court decision finding that the Village Board had taken a “hard look” at the potential environmental impacts from the creation of a “Business Districts Plan” and was not required to issue a draft environmental impact statement (“DEIS”) prior to issuance of a negative declaration and the approval of zoning amendments.

Lake Grove Partners LLC, the owners of property within the zone complained that the new zoning precluded development of “Big Box” stores such as Home Depot and that the Village should have prepared a DEIS to look at the potential economic impacts of precluding such stores. The Village argued that the detailed plan and reviews by its consultants was sufficient to demonstrate that the zone changes would have beneficial impacts, including the impacts upon potential traffic generation. In addition the Village found that the changes would maintain the vitality of the existing retail districts. The Court agreed with the Village, finding the Village had taken the required hard look and had provided a reasoned elaboration of the basis for the negative declaration.

The appeal was argued by Katherine Zalantis of Silverberg Zalantis LLC, who acted as co-counsel with Mark Anesh of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP on the appeal.

Published on:

A municipality is liable under a construction contract once awarded, irrespective of whether the municipality decides to terminate before the contract is actually signed. In the case of Xavier Contracting LLC v. the City of Rye the Appellate Division Second Department held the City had liability for the contract awarded to Xavier, despite the fact that the City terminated the project before the contracts were executed because one of six other contractors on the project failed to meet the bonding requirements.

The City had let seven contracts out to bid for a construction project that included general construction, electric, plumbing etc. The City awarded seven contracts including one to Xavier for general construction. The only requirement for moving forward on the project was that each successful bidder had to submit proof of insurance and a bond. One contractor failed to produce a bond. The City decided not to go with the next lowest bidder but rather to rescind all of the contracts. Xavier sued claiming it was entitled to compensation under its contract.

The Supreme Court granted summary judgment on liability. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that absent an express provision in the bid documents making each of the separate contracts contingent on the others the City “could not unilaterally refuse to perform.” Xavier was represented by Silverberg Zalantis LLC

Published on:

A zoning board may consider public safety when interpreting a zoning ordinance but must also look at the meaning of the ordinance, noted the Appellate Division, Second Department in Matter of Northern Dutchess Rod and Gun Club v. Town of Rhinebeck. The Rod and Gun Club sought to place trap shooting within 300 feet of a road. The local ordinance provides that if such uses are closer than 500 feet to the “property boundary” a variance is required. The Zoning Enforcement Officer determined that since the property was bisected by a road, the road was not the property boundary. Therefore the proposed use was not within 500 feet of a property boundary and did not require a variance.

On appeal by other property owners to the zoning board of appeals, the board determined that a variance was required and stated: “the issue of public safety takes precedence over the issue of what constitutes a property boundary”. The Appellate Division noted that when an ordinance is ambiguous a zoning board may take into consideration public safety in reaching an interpretation. Yet the Court found that in this instance there was a failure to interpret the term property boundary. The Court remitted the matter to the Zoning Board for further consideration

Published on:

An appellate court found a zoning board was arbitrary when it refused to hear an area variance application for the same property which had been denied an area variance nearly twenty years earlier. On April 25, 2006 the Appellate Division Second Department, in Matter of Moore v. Town of Islip Board of Appeals, held that while a zoning board may decline to rehear an application in the absence of new facts, it may not refuse to hear an application where there has been a substantial change in circumstances.

In this case there was an application to build a house on a substandard lot and a similar application had been denied previously. Yet, there was a new property owner and more importantly the application sought fewer variances and eliminated a proposed two car garage. The Court remitted the matter to the zoning board for reconsideration in view of the Court’s findings.

Interestingly the Court did not point out that when the original application was made the legal criteria for granting an area variance was much more stringent than the present criteria. Perhaps this factor by itself is a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a rehearing?

Contact Information